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THE ADMINISTRATIVE JUDICIARY'S
INDEPENDENCE MYTH
James E. Moliterno*
INTRODUCTION
Are administrative judges' independent in the usual judicial
independence sense? To the extent they are, of what are they
independent? If they should be independent, what does
independence mean in their unique context? In this Article, I will
explore a question that has occupied some considerable attention
among administrative judges and administrative law scholars.2 I
am neither. Instead, I bring the perspective of legal and judicial
* Tazewell Taylor Professor of Law, The College of William & Mary.
Many thanks to my colleague, Charles Koch, for introducing me to the
fascinating world of administrative judges and administrative law generally.
He should not be blamed for my errors or lack of administrative law
sophistication. Thanks as well for marvelous research assistance on this project
to Donald Goodman and Margaret Shoup and, in general, to the Graduate
Research Fellows program at William & Mary, which provides seemingly
limitless, excellent research assistance.
1. In this Article, I use the general term administrative judge or
administrative judiciary to include administrative law judges, administrative
judges, hearing officers, and others who might fairly be included in the so-called
'administrative judiciary." The differences among members of this group have
modest effects on parts of this Article, effects discussed in specific sections. In
the main, the differences are not consequential for this Article.
2. See, e.g., Ron Beal, The Texas State Office of Administrative Hearings:
Establishing Independent Adjudicators in Contested Case Proceedings While
Preserving the Power of Institutional Decision-Making, 25 J. NAT'L ASS'N ADMIN.
L. JUDGES 119 (2005); James F. Flanagan, Redefining the Role of the State
Administrative Law Judge: Central Panels and Their Impact on State ALJ
Authority and Standards of Agency Review, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 1355, 1382-85
(2002); Richard B. Hoffman & Frank P. Cihlar, Judicial Independence: Can It
Be Without Article III?, 46 MERCER L. REV. 863 (1995); Harold J. Krent &
Lindsay DuVall, Accommodating ALJ Decision Making Independence with
Institutional Interests of the Administrative Judiciary, 25 J. NAT'L ASS'N ADMIN.
L. JUDGES 1 (2005); L. Hope O'Keeffe, Note, Administrative Law Judges,
Performance Evaluation, and Production Standards: Judicial Independence
Versus Employee Accountability, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 591 (1986).
* Indicates page numbering from journal of original publication -
41 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1191 (2006).
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ethics to the issue of administrative judge independence.3
After a bit of background on role and rule in the analysis of
ethics issues in Part I, Part II asks whether it is proper to call
administrative judges "judges." Concluding that such a designation
is accurate, Part III gives background on judicial independence and
distinguishes independence from another judicial attribute,
impartiality. Part IV takes this discussion of judicial independence
and applies it to the role of administrative judge, concluding that
administrative judges, though properly called judges, are not meant
to be independent in the judicial sense.
The lack of judicial independence of administrative judges is no
mark of failure or embarrassment. On the contrary, the role of
administrative judge, properly understood, is critically important to
our justice delivery system, although it simultaneously does not
implicate judicial independence. Administrative judges have an
important role to fill: they are meant to preside impartially over fair
hearings that implement and administer agency policy. To perform
this critical role in the most effective way, administrative judges are
not to function in a judicially independent way. Instead, they must
recognize that their role demands adherence to agency policy and
goals. Judges of the judicial branch, acting independently of the
executive and legislative branches, will apply contested legal
principles and rules to executive agency action, including that taken
by the administrative judiciary.
I. ETHICS, ROLE, AND INDEPENDENCE
Ethics issues are all about role and context. Once past the
simplistic "don't lie, cheat, or steal" rule, and past just staring at the
text of the rules themselves in an entirely formalist way, everything
in professional ethics is about role and context. Role and context
determine the appropriate actions and attributes of legal
professionals. To be sure, the profession has produced a formalized
version of the lawyer's and judge's roles by adopting sets of ethics
rules,4 the violation of which produces professional consequences.
3. With the range of agencies, each with its distinct mission, structure,
history, and regulations, there are few absolutes and little consistency in
terminology in administrative law, and, therefore, in the life of the
administrative judge. Terminology is difficult to manage because of varied
usages in varied agencies. Some statements that may seem in error to some
readers may simply be a reflection of my focus on one agency structure or
another that is inconsistent with the reader's knowledge base. Any real errors
that remain in this piece are mine and do not belong to those from whom I have
gained my modest level of administrative law knowledge.
4. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (2003); MODEL CODE OF JUD.
CONDUCT (2004).
But those rules are a starting point, rather than an ending point, for
most serious analysis of lawyer and judge conduct. They play a
part-but only a part-in lawyer regulation.5 They cover lawyers
and judges in a general way, but mostly fail to account for
differences in the practice settings, and say little at all about what
makes a good lawyer or judge. To play a role well, whether it be in a
play, in a sport, or in a professional milieu, knowing the rules of
acting, of the game, or of the profession is far from fulfilling the role
6
well. Understanding the role illuminates the rules' meaning.
Consider, generally, the attributes of the lawyer's role: a lawyer
acts as a representative of a client (as a special sort of agent),
pursuing that client's interests within prescribed boundaries, while
maintaining an eye on the public interest. These simple attributes
of the lawyer's role dictate the nature, scope, and interpretation of
the lawyer ethics rules, confidentiality rules, conflicts rules, and so
on. Yet, this general description belies the complexity of the wide
variety of sub-roles that lawyers serve, depending on their
particular practice setting.
Prosecutors and other government lawyers have no individual
client and, by role, must serve the public interest to an extent
greater than other lawyers must, creating different confidentiality
7
and conflicts implications, all while facing the special burdens, joys,
and challenges of being a public employee and a public official.8
Lawyers for corporations fill a slightly different role as well,
representing an entity rather than a flesh and blood individual, and
5. David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARv. L. REV.
799, 804-14 (1992).
6. James E. Moliterno, An Analysis of Ethics Teaching in Law Schools:
Replacing Lost Benefits of the Apprentice System in the Academic Atmosphere,
60 U. CIN. L. REV. 83, 99 (1991) ("[L]earning to play the game well (learning to
lawyer ethically) is accomplished not so much by learning the game's rules,
though learn them the players must, as by the activity of playing (experience
with lawyering behavior) .... A player might well learn the text and basic
meaning of the rules by reading and discussing them; but to learn the subtleties
that define what it means to play well, the player must experience the play
itself.").
7. James E. Moliterno, The Federal Government Lawyer's Duty to Breach
Confidentiality, 14 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 633, 633 (2005).
8. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (2003) (noting that a
prosecutor has the responsibility for being not only an advocate, but also a
minister of justice who carries the obligation of ensuring that defendants
receive "procedural justice and that guilt is decided upon the basis of sufficient
evidence"); Steven K. Berenson, Public Lawyers, Private Values: Can, Should,
and Will Government Lawyers Serve the Public Interest?, 41 B.C. L. REV. 789,
790 (2000).
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different ethics rules and interpretations apply to them as a result. 9
In-house corporate lawyers have, as well, their lawyer role swirled
with that of employee, creating further complications in the law that
governs their conduct and its implications. ° Criminal defense
lawyers, in recognition of their special role in representing the
individual in jeopardy against the power of the state, face particular
ethical challenges. And the list goes on and on from practice setting
to practice setting."
And then there is the judge's role and the range of ethics
standards with which judges must comply. Judges who are also
licensed to practice law must abide by the lawyer ethics rules that
are not representation-related. The judge's role requires an entirely
new lens for ethics analysis: forget (largely) about confidentiality;
forget about client loyalty and those sorts of conflicts. Judges must
focus on integrity, impartiality, independence, fairness, competence,
and, because of the judge's closer connection with the system of
justice and the public interest involved, appearance of impropriety
as it relates to public confidence in the justice system.
And then there are administrative judges. If we are not
surprised that lawyer ethics principles change from practice setting
to practice setting, we should not be surprised to find that the ethics
attributes of the one kind of judge (an administrative judge) should
differ from those of another kind of judge. Arguably, administrative
judges have the most complex mixture of roles, and therefore of
ethics guidelines, of any law professional. For those administrative
judges who are lawyers, the lawyers' rules govern some aspects of
their behavior. 2 To some extent, the ethics rules for judges apply to
administrative judges, though finding the appropriate, specific set of
governing rules is not always straightforward. 3 As public officials,
9. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 307, 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (Supp. II 2004)
(requiring the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") to issue rules
setting minimum standards of professional conduct for attorneys appearing and
practicing before the SEC); Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 391-92
(1981); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13 (2003).
10. See, e.g., Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court, 876 P.2d 487, 490
(Cal. 1994); Balla v. Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104, 110 (Ill. 1991); Mourad v.
Auto. Club Ins. Ass'n, 465 N.W.2d 395, 397-98 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991); Crews v.
Buckman Labs. Int'l, Inc., 78 S.W.3d 852, 858 (Tenn. 2002); ABA Comm. on
Ethics and Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 01-424 (2001).
11. See James E. Moliterno, Practice Setting as an Organizing Theme for a
Law and Ethics of Lawyering Curriculum, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 393, 394
(1998).
12. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.1-.4 (2003).
13. See MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT (2004); MODEL CODE OF JUD.
CONDUCT FOR STATE ADMIN. LAW JUDGES (1995); MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT
FOR FED. ADMIN. LAW JUDGES (1989).
administrative judges must account for the public interest in
somewhat the same way as does a prosecutor, a government lawyer,
a commissioner of an agency, or a bureaucrat. 14  As a federal or
state employee, administrative judges must comply with applicable
ethics statutes regarding conflicts and regulations of their particular
agencies."5
Complicating this overlay of ethics rules is the reality of many
administrative judges' particular agency roles. Often, one of the
litigants before the administrative judge is the judge's employer.
When the agency appears in the matter, one of the lawyers before
the administrative judge is a co-worker, at least in some broad
sense.1 6 Often, the experts for one of the litigants are co-workers of
the judge; often, the administrator of one of the litigants is in control
of the judge's budget. What seems to pass for ethics determinations
regarding some administrative 7 decisions are really employment
law issues 8 that find a place in the Merit Systems Protection Board
14. See 7 U.S.C. § 87 (2000) (prohibiting a person performing an official
function under the grain standards chapter from being "financially interested
... in any business entity owning or operating any grain elevator or warehouse
or engaged in the merchandising of grain"); 18 U.S.C. § 207 (2000, Supp. III
2005) (restricting, for a time, former officers, employees, and elected officials of
the executive and legislative branches from communicating with an officer or
employee of the United States or District of Columbia with the intent to
influence that person on behalf of another in connection with described
matters); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 1090 (Deering 2002) (prohibiting public officials
from being "financially interested in any contract made by them in their official
capacity" or from being "purchasers at any sale or vendors at any purchase
made by them in their official capacity"); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-4304 (1997) ("No
local governmental officer or employee shall, in the capacity of such an officer or
employee, make or participate in the making of a contract with any person or
business by which the officer or employee is employed or in whose business the
officer or employee has a substantial interest.").
15. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 164.40(a) (2005) (prohibiting Environmental
Protection Agency administrative law judges from deciding "any matter in
connection with a proceeding where he has a financial interest in any of the
parties or a relationship with a party that would make it otherwise
inappropriate for him to act").
16. See 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (2000) (prohibiting an employee from consulting a
person or party on a fact in issue without giving all parties an opportunity to
participate; prohibiting an employee from being subject to the supervision of an
employee or agent performing investigative or prosecutorial functions for an
agency; and prohibiting an employee engaged in the performance of
investigative or prosecutorial functions for an agency in that or a factually
related case from participating or advising in the decision, recommended
decision, or agency review, except as witness or counsel in public proceedings).
17. See id. § 7703.
18. See Yates v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 145 F.3d 1480, 1481 (1998).
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review process.19
No other legal professional has this complex a mix-not private
practice lawyers, not criminal defense lawyers, not prosecutors, not
civil-side government lawyers, and not ordinary judges.
The administrative judiciary presents a unique challenge for
ethics study. Role is all that really matters at the bottom, and the
role of the administrative judge is not merely complex in its generic
form, but also varies further from agency to agency, taking into
account the unique mission, history, and political setting of each
agency. The differences between state and federal agencies alone
makes generalization dangerous. And within state systems, which
themselves vary, or within the federal system, the nuances and
variances are myriad and significant. Studying the administrative
judiciary requires studying the administrative state. I make no
pretense of fully understanding the nuances present in the roles of
the wide range of individuals who might fairly be called
administrative judges. I will attempt to confine myself to common,
generic attributes of most administrative judges, and I address in
this Article one issue regarding the role of administrative judge:
independence.
Plainly, a major issue for administrative judges is the friction
between independence and accountability. And given the unique
setting of a judge who is employed by what is frequently one of the
parties before the judge, that issue's prominence is unsurprising. If
independence is truly a core attribute of the American style of
judging, and if administrative judges are not independent, then
administrative judges are more administrative functionaries with
judge-like duties than they are judges. By contrast, if independence
is not an essential attribute of judging, then perhaps non-
independent administrative judges are judges after all.
In the end, the role question is always the same: what does the
system within which this person functions expect of her? And for
this inquiry, what does the system expect of administrative judges?
Are they expert dispute resolvers within an agency, still carrying
out the mission of the agency? What is the implication of the role
question for administrative judges?
II. ARE ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGES "JUDGES"?
Administrative judges are judges in a fairly narrow, specific
sense. They possess, of course, the fundamental core of the judicial
definition, which, while nowhere given authoritatively, is by wide
19. 5 U.S.C. § 7521 (providing that "good cause" is required for discipline).
There have been only twenty-four reported cases since 1946; see infra note 150
and accompanying text.
approval known to consist in the impartial adjudication of cases. A
judge is "[a] public official appointed or elected to hear and decide
legal matters in court."2° The American Bar Association's Model
Code of Judicial Conduct does not define "judge" in its terminology
section; it does, however, state that "[tihe judge is an arbiter of facts
and law for the resolution of disputes and a highly visible symbol of
government under the rule of law."21 Administrative judges are
certainly both, and, in a most important and fundamental sense,
they can certainly be called "judges." The Supreme Court has
acknowledged as much:
There can be little doubt that the role of the modern
federal hearing examiner or administrative law judge within
this framework is "functionally comparable" to that of a judge.
His powers are often, if not generally, comparable to those of a
trial judge. . . . More importantly, the process of agency
adjudication is currently structured so as to assure that the
hearing examiner exercises his independent judgment on the
evidence before him,22 free from pressures by the parties or
other officials within the agency.
These protections on impartial decisionmaking are so
important, in fact, that, like other judges, administrative judges are
granted an absolute immunity from suit for actions committed in
the performance of their duties.24 Administrative judges are true
judges on this basis because they are impartial decisionmakers who
adjudicate disputes between parties.
All judges share this common characteristic. Even in legal
systems that follow a different model, such as the civil law, judges
are meant to be impartial adjudicators of disputes. One of the
unique characteristics of the civil law, for example, is "the
responsibility it places on the judge in dispute resolution."25 Civil
law countries commonly do not use juries on the belief that the law
is "too technical and refined to be properly understood by laymen"
26
20. BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 844 (7th ed. 1999).
21. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT pmbl. (2004).
22. Interestingly, the Court uses the word "independent" here. The context
reveals that the Court is referring to independent fact finding, an activity more
associated with the judicial attribute of impartiality rather than the traditional
notions of judicial independence. See infra Part III.
23. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513 (1978).
24. Id. at 514.
25. Charles H. Koch, Jr., The Advantages of the Civil Law Judicial Design
as the Model for Emerging Legal Systems, 11 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 139,
139 (2004).
26. Konstantinos D. Kerameus, A Civilian Lawyer Looks at Common Law
Procedure, 47 LA. L. REV. 493, 502 (1987).
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and that trial by jury suffers from "the cost of insensibility to
general legal precepts and to predictability of result."27  It is,
therefore, entirely the judge's responsibility to determine both facts
and law. Administrative judges find facts and determine the law to
be applied to those facts, though they do not make new law.28 In this
sense, an administrative judge is very much like a civil law judge,
but again, very much a judge.
Indeed, administrative judges in the Social Security
Administration ("SSA") are like civilian judges in more than their
sole responsibility for adjudication. A SSA proceeding "is a system
bearing little resemblance to the traditions of Anglo-American
jurisprudence. 29 Specifically, the inquisitorial system that prevails
in the civilian tradition is also commonly used in SSA hearings. In
the inquisitorial system, the judge plays an active role in both the
30fact-gathering and the fact-finding processes. In many forms of
administrative hearings, the government is not present, and
although the plaintiff (claimant, really) presents his claim, the
administrative judge calls witnesses, collects evidence, and ensures
that the record is fully developed.31 All of this establishes that
administrative judges, while more active in the adjudicatory process
than their Article III counterparts, are certainly judges in the broad
sense-even if they often resemble their civil law, more than their
common law, counterparts. In the end, they are impartial
adjudicators of disputes.
Administrative judges are also like civil law judges, and unlike
common law judges, in that they are not formally bound by their
own precedent. The fact that "the doctrine of stare decisis generally
is not ... fully or strictly applicable to administrative decisions" 32 is
well understood by administrative law scholars and courts.3 Since
27. Id. at 503.
28. See infra Part IV.
29. Jeffrey S. Wolfe & Lisa B. Proszek, Interaction Dynamics in Federal
Administrative Decision Making: The Role of the Inquisitorial Judge and the
Adversarial Lawyer, 33 TULSA L.J. 293, 295 (1997).
30. Id. at 303.
31. Id. at 310; see also Frank S. Bloch et al., Developing a Full and Fair
Evidentiary Record in a Nonadversary Setting: Two Proposals for Improving
Social Security Disability Adjudications, 25 CARDOzO L. REV. 1, 31 (2003).
32. E. H. Schopler, Annotation, Comment Note: Applicability of Stare
Decisis Doctrine to Decisions of Administrative Agencies, 79 A.L.R.2d 1126,
1131-32 (1961).
33. See, e.g., B&J Oil & Gas v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 353 F.3d
71, 76 (D.C. Cir. 2004) ("[W~e observed-unremarkably-that agencies may
change their policies as long as they engage in reasoned decisionmaking and
explain their breaks with precedent."); State Airlines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics
Bd., 174 F.2d 510, 518 (D.C. Cir. 1949), rev'd on other grounds, 338 U.S. 572
the doctrine of stare decisis "has for its object the salutary effect of
uniformity, certainty, and stability in the law, 3 it contributes to
impartial decisionmaking by preventing judges from deciding cases
simply as they will. Instead, they must follow precedent. The
comparable limiting principle for civil law judges is the Code.
Administrative judges, not bound by their own precedent, are guided
and constrained in their determinations by the state of the law
external to their own decisions: statutes, court precedent, and
• 31
administrative regulations.
Although administrative judges are not required to follow
precedent, they are required to make their decisions impartially
based on factors outside of their own senses of proper agency policy.
Clearly, administrative judges must follow the agency's legislative
rules, but, perhaps more controversially with some administrative
judges, they must also follow other statements or indicators of
agency policy.3 6 They are, after all, agents of the agency and have no
independent authority to divine policy. The only true source of their
authority is the agency itself, and their judgment must be informed
by the agency's and not their own sense of good policy. This aspect
is an important distinction between administrative judges and
Article III judges and their state court counterparts.
In reality, if not requiremed, administrative judges generally
follow precedents in the same way as Article III courts,37 further
cementing their status as impartial decisionmakers, and therefore
eminently worthy of the name, "judge." However, the fact remains
that Article III judges are able to make law by the doctrine of stare
decisis, whereas administrative judges are entirely incapable of
making law which is actually, rather than merely customarily,
binding upon their fellows, or even upon their inferiors. In this way,
then, administrative judges are judges in that they are impartial
decisionmakers, but of a very different kind than are Article III
judges or common law judges generally.
III. IMPARTIALITY AND INDEPENDENCE
Like most carefully defined concepts, judicial independence
(1950) ("[Aldministrative agencies are free from the application of the judicial
doctrines of stare decisis and resjudicata .... ").
34. Schopler, supra note 32, at 1128.
35. As a practical matter, requiring administrative judges in many
settings-SSA determinations, for example-to follow precedent would be
virtually impossible to manage given the multitude of judges and decisions.
36. Charles H. Koch, Jr., Policymaking by the Administrative Judiciary, 56
ALA. L. REV. 693, 695-96 (2005).
37. Schopler, supra note 32, at 1132 ("[A]dministrative agencies ... act
very much like courts, as regards precedents.").
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exists as a matter of degree. In the narrow (and probably more
precise) sense, independence is about insulating a judge's
decisionmaking from interference from either the electorate, the
legislative branch, or the executive branch. Thought of this way,
some judges are more independent than others. Impartiality as a
judicial trait is often confused with independence. Impartiality is
about fair-minded, neutral decisionmaking. Independence is created
primarily by structural aspects of government. Impartiality is
created primarily by the structure of the dispute resolution process.
All judges are in systems that foster impartiality; some judges are in
structures that foster independence. Is independence a
fundamental attribute of a judge? What is independence in the
judicial sense?38
Another way of seeing the relationship is to say that
independence is a subset of impartiality, isolating only those
influences that come from the electorate, the political process, or the
other branches of government. The independence subset is not
necessary to the role of judge, but is a desirable attribute if the
judge is meant to check the other branches.
One major process attribute designed to foster impartiality is
38. See, e.g., WALTER GELLHORN, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS 78-
81 (1941); CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW & PRACTICE (2d ed. 1997);
RICHARD J. PIERCE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 9.10 (4th ed. 2002); Stephen
B. Burbank, What Do We Mean by "Judicial Independence"?, 64 OHIO ST. L.J.
323, 338-39 (2003); Paul D. Carrington, Judicial Independence and Democratic
Accountability in Highest State Courts, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 79, 80
(1998); Paul J. De Muniz, Politicizing State Judicial Elections: A Threat to
Judicial Independence, 38 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 367, 370 (2002); John A.
Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary:
Institutionalizing Judicial Restraint, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 965 (2002); Walter
Gellhorn, The Improvement of Public Administration, 2 NAT'L LAW. GUILD Q. 20,
23 (1940); Charles G. Geyh, Judicial Independence, Judicial Accountability, and
the Role of Constitutional Norms in Congressional Regulation of the Courts, 78
IND. L.J. 153, 164-65 (2003); Vincent R. Johnson, The Ethical Foundations of
American Judicial Independence, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1007, 1012 (2002);
Pamela S. Karlan, Two Concepts of Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV.
535, 536 (1999); Irving R. Kaufman, The Essence of Judicial Independence, 80
COLUM. L. REV. 671, 688 (1980) [hereinafter Kaufman, Essence of Judicial
Independence]; Irving R. Kaufman, Chilling Judicial Independence, 88 YALE
L.J. 681, 683-84 (1979) [hereinafter Kaufman, Chilling Judicial Independence];
Martin Shapiro, APA: Past, Present, Future, 72 VA. L. REV. 447, 458-64, 467
(1986); George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure
Act Emerges from New Deal Politics, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 1557, 1572 (1996);
Frances Kahn Zemans, The Accountable Judge: Guardian of Judicial
Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 625, 632 (1999); Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Legal
Profession and the Development of Administrative Law, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
1119, 1125 (1997).
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the prohibition on ex parte communications. Ex parte
communications are communications with either party to a case
concerning the case in the absence of the other parties; they are
forbidden by the American Bar Association's Model Code of Judicial
Conduct 9 and are not permitted under the Administrative
Procedure Act ("APA") in formal adjudications." The basic concept
of a fair hearing entails contemporaneous opportunities to be heard
in response to an opposing party's factual and legal assertions. Ex
parte communications undermine that concept by allowing one
party access to the decisionmaker in the absence of others. A judge
so exposed to the unchecked arguments of one party experiences a
threat to the judge's impartiality, not independence.
Dispute resolution structures other than the ex parte
prohibition foster impartiality by removing the judge's personal
interests from the equation. The classic impartiality case
41
illustrates: During the prohibition era, the General Code of Ohio
gave mayors, among others, authority to try without a jury cases of
persons charged with unlawfully possessing intoxicating liquor in
violation of the state's Prohibition Act.42  Defendant Tumey was
tried and convicted before the mayor of the Village of North College
Hill, Ohio, for such a violation.43 Tumey appealed his conviction as a
violation of the due process guaranteed him under the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution.44 Fines collected upon conviction
under the statute were divided between the state and the village. 45
Under a local village ordinance, deputy marshals, detectives,
prosecuting attorneys, and the mayor were compensated from the
village's portion of the fines above their normal salaries for theirS • 46
parts in securing a conviction. Since no fees or costs in such cases
were paid to the mayor, except by the defendant if convicted, there
was no way by which the mayor would be paid for his service as
judge if he did not convict those who were brought before him.47 The
Supreme Court held:
39. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Canon 3, § B(7) (2004).
40. 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (2000). The ex parte and separation of functions
prohibitions together insulate administrative judges from party influence in
formal adjudications. The restrictions themselves are described in 5 U.S.C. §
557. Through 5 U.S.C. § 556, these restrictions apply in the instances of formal
hearing as described in 5 U.S.C. § 554(a).
41. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
42. Id. at 516-17.
43. Id. at 516.
44. Id. at 514-15.
45. Id. at 517.
46. Id. at 518-19.
47. Id. at 520.
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[I]t certainly violates the Fourteenth Amendment, and
deprives a defendant in a criminal case of due process of law,
to subject his liberty or property to the judgment of a court the
judge of which has a direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary
interest in reaching a conclusion against him in his case.'
Additionally, the mayor was "the chief executive of the village," and
thus responsible for the finances of the village. 9 The statute offered
the village officers "a means of substantially adding to the income of
the village to relieve it from further taxation." °  The Court
summarized, "A situation in which an official perforce occupies two
practically and seriously inconsistent positions, one partisan and the
other judicial, necessarily involves a lack of due process of law in the
trial of defendants charged with crimes before him."5'
By contrast to the ever-necessary judicial attribute of
impartiality, some judges are meant to be more independent than
others, without diminishing the sense in which the less independent
judge is a judge. Even the most independent U.S. judges, Article III
judges, are not completely5 2 and literally independent:
53
"Independence" literally means the absence of
dependence, which is to say complete autonomy and
insusceptibility to external guidance, influence, or control. If
48. Id. at 523.
49. Id. at 533.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 534.
52. See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 38, at 326-27 (recognizing that a
completely independent judiciary would not create an orderly society); Terri
Peretti, A Normative Appraisal of Social Scientific Knowledge Regarding
Judicial Independence, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 349, 349 (2003) ("Evidence abounds
that American judges possess only a modest amount of independence.").
53. For example, the judiciary was threatened with impeachment and
restrictions on their judicial independence following the case of a Florida
woman, Terri Schiavo. Schiavo lapsed into a permanent vegetative state after
heart failure deprived her brain of oxygen for an extended period. See Carl
Hulse & David D. Kirkpatrick, Even Death Does Not Quiet Harsh Political
Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2005, at Al. For fifteen years, a feeding tube
provided artificial nutrition and hydration to keep her body alive. See id. In
early 2005, federal courts refused to get involved after lower courts ordered
doctors to remove Schiavo's feeding tube. See id. Then House Majority Leader
Tom DeLay suggested impeachment for those federal judges who did not
intervene in Schiavo's case, warning they would be responsible for their
behavior. See id. DeLay stepped back from those warnings somewhat, but still
instructed the House Judiciary Committee to examine the actions of federal
judges in the Schiavo case and to recommend possible legislation. See David
Sommer, Schiavo Autopsy, TAMPA TRIB., June 16, 2005, at 1; Sheryl Gay
Stolberg, Majority Leader Asks House Panel to Review Judges, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
14, 2005, at Al.
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we think of judicial independence in literal terms, however,
federal judges are not "independent," at least not as
dictionaries define the word. They are not autonomous,
because Congress retains ultimate control over their budget,
jurisdiction, structure, size, administration, and rulemaking.
Moreover, they are susceptible to outside influence; if judges
engage in behavior (on or off the bench) that the political
branches characterize as criminal, they may be prosecuted and
imprisoned; if they make politically unacceptable decisions,
the President and Senate may decline to appoint them to
higher judicial office; if they commit "high crimes and
misdemeanors," they may be impeached and removed from
office; if they make decisions with which higher courts
disagree, their decisions may be reversed; and if they engage
in behavior that judicial councils regard as misconduct, they
may be disciplined.54
In turn, "[flederal judges are thereby rendered autonomous in
the limited sense that they have an enforceable monopoly over 'the
judicial power,' and are insulated from two discrete forms of
influence or control, namely, threats to their tenure and salary."5 5
That is what makes Article III judges independent. Why are they
not completely independent? Because "[ilncreased judicial
independence is not always better."56 Judicial independence is not
an end in itself; it is a means to an end,57 and it ought to be curtailed
when it ceases to be conducive to that end.
What, then, is the purpose of Article III judicial independence?
What end is served? While independence, in part, enhances
impartiality, that enhancement is far from the primary purpose of
independence. Most fundamentally, independence "preserve[s] the
integrity of the judiciary as a separate branch of government."58 We
54. Geyh, supra note 38, at 159 (footnotes omitted).
55. Id.
56. Frank B. Cross, Thoughts on Goldilocks and Judicial Independence, 64
OHIO ST. L.J. 195, 195 (2003) (footnote omitted).
57. Burbank, supra note 38, at 324; see Geyh, supra note 38, at 163 n.29
("[Jiudicial independence is not an end in itself, but an instrumental value that
serves another end.").
58. Id. at 162; see also Cross, supra note 56, at 195 (defining judicial
independence as "freedom from control .. .by the other political branches of
government"); Ferejohn & Kramer, supra note 38, at 962 (noting that the end of
independence and accountability is "a well-functioning system of adjudication");
Kaufman, Essence of Judicial Independence, supra note 38, at 691 (observing
that the Supreme Court's definition of judicial independence has stated that its
purpose is keeping the judiciary "free from undue interference by the President
or Congress"); Kaufman, Chilling Judicial Independence, supra note 38, at 713
(arguing that judicial independence should not only protect the independence of
the judicial branch, but also the independence of the individual judges);
Elizabeth A. Larkin, Judicial Selection Methods: Judicial Independence and
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want individual judges to decide cases without being influenced by
anything other than the facts and the law. We also want the
judiciary to function as a third branch of government and check the
other two. At the same time, however, we do not want the judiciary
to be able to run amok, doing whatever it wants. So we guarantee
judicial tenure and salary, but we do not guarantee that the entire
judiciary will be free from any checks from the other branches. We
see, then, elements of both independence and accountability59 in the
formulation of our federal judiciary. But to make the judicial checks
on the other branches meaningful, the Article III balance is
decidedly tilted toward independence and away from accountability.
These accountability checks on the courts are almost never
60
used, even though they are technically available to Congress,
perhaps because Congress does not want to interfere with judicial
independence, or perhaps for fear of partisan tit for tat. There is,
therefore, a definite "tension"6' between independence and
accountability.62 How can we resolve this tension, keeping judges
accountable to the other branches while not beholden to them?
Geyh distinguished between three types of independence in
order to help explain how the Constitution, and the way we have
interpreted it, does so. There is "doctrinal" independence (simply
the independence which Article III makes indisputable), "functional"
independence (that independence which is at the sufferance of
Congress), and "customary" independence (the independence
granted by the customs of interfering or not interfering in
constitutionally permitted ways with judicial independence).'
The political branches struck a constitutional balance over time
Popular Democracy, 79 DENV. U. L. REV. 65, 65 (2001) (explaining that judicial
independence enables courts to "serve as an institutional check on the
legislative and executive branches and that judicial independence is essential
for the judiciary to protect the rule of law") (footnotes omitted).
59. The desirable degree of accountability, of course, depends upon our
theory of judicial decision making. See Larkin, supra note 58, at 66 (recognizing
that the importance of judicial accountability over and against judicial
independence depends on "what political and social role a judge should play").
The debate over judicial activism is crucial on this point; here, however, it is not
at issue.
60. See Geyh, supra note 38, at 163-64.
61. Larkin, supra note 58, at 65.
62. Burbank has argued that this is not really a conflict, but simply
another side to the judicial coin. However, his own phraseology establishes that
the two balance one another, and so the distinction is most likely solely
rhetorical; Burbank merely means to say that the tension between
independence and accountability is not a conflict, but a balancing. See
Burbank, supra note 38, at 330-32.
63. Geyh, supra note 38, at 164-65.
between judicial accountability and independence.64 This balance,
which is represented by customary independence, can be altered by
the political branches.65 Similarly, the courts may alter the scope of
doctrinal independence.66  Though doctrinal independence and
customary independence are bound to constitutional norms,
functional independence is "shaped by the vagaries of any given
day's public policy."67 This customary independence is not, of course,
inviolable. However, methods of constraining the judiciary which
have traditionally been considered antithetical to judicial
independence are presumptively unconstitutional according to this
scheme. 6 Essentially, Geyh argued that Congress has refrained
from interfering with this "customary independence" because it has
so interpreted the Constitution as to make such interference
unconstitutional.69  Congress is, by so doing, exercising self-
restraint,7 ° just as courts occasionally do.
Article III judges, at least when thought of as members of courts
made up of several judges (the Supreme Court, the courts of appeal,
and the district court panels), are themselves the products of a
combination of executive and legislative choice. 71 The selection and
confirmation process is a real but modest detraction from judicial
independence. Although each individual Article III judge may be
almost entirely insulated from legislative and executive oversight
once confirmed (there remains only the impeachment threat), even
they are less than perfectly independent. They remain as members
of courts the composition of which will be influenced by future
appointments.72  Even seeming lone-ranger district court judges
have changing panels of future appellate courts to which they look
64. Id. at 165.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 165-66.
69. Id. at 166.
70. Id. at 165.
71. See MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS: A
CONSTITUTIONAL & HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 141 (2000) (discussing the 1999
choreographed exchange between President Clinton and Senator Orrin Hatch,
in which Senator Hatch agreed to move pending judicial nominations through
the confirmation process as long as the President kept Senator Hatch's
preferred candidate moving through the nomination process).
72. See, e.g., Richard L. Revesz, Litigation and Settlement in the Federal
Appellate Courts: Impact of Panel Selection Procedures on Ideologically Divided
Courts, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 685, 686 (2000); Richard L. Revesz, Ideology,
Collegiality, and the D.C. Circuit: A Reply to Chief Judge Harry T. Edwards, 85
VA. L. REv. 805, 806, 808 (1999); Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation,
Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717, 1719 (1997).
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forward. Nonetheless, Article III judges possess the greatest
measure of independence of any American judges.
Where does this leave accountability, however, if Congress has
progressively abandoned the constitutionally permitted methods of
curbing the courts? Perhaps it lies entirely in the appointment
process." The appointment process is the only constitutional
restraint on the judiciary that Congress has shown itself willing to
exercise; every other method (adjusting court size, reducing court
budgets, impeachment for unfavorable decisions) has been gradually
abandoned, forming the "customary" independence of Article III
courts. 74  The appointment process stands as the only remaining
check on Article III independence, ensuring the judiciary's integrity
as a third branch of government so that it can serve as a check on
the two others and its own accountability.75
Many state court judges have a high degree of independence
from the legislative and executive branches, but less than that of
Article III judges. State judges lack life tenure and perfect
protection against compensation reduction. State court judicial
selection and renewal processes result in structures less friendly to
independence than those of Article III judges. Elected state judges
have significant independence from the legislative and executive
branches, but must answer to the electorate and have a lower
measure of independence from the people as a result. To be sure, in
76
many states, terms are long, and reelection processes so
substantially favor incumbents that this reduction from life tenure
may, in practice, be modest. But it exists to some measure in all
instances. Given the new freedom to campaign in judicial
elections,77 independence from the electorate is likely to diminish
73. Geyh, supra note 38, at 220 ("[Ihf Congress is to reclaim ground lost to
the Supreme Court ... it will be via the appointments process.").
74. Id. at 211 (noting that Congress restrains itself against limiting the
court except in the appointments process).
75. Whether or not reducing congressional control of the judiciary entirely
to the appointment process does, in fact, maintain judicial accountability is not
at issue here; we are only concerned with the principles behind the facts, not
the facts themselves.
76. See, e.g., Paul M. Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional
Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 605, 630 (1981); Donald A. Dripps,
Fundamental Retribution Error: Criminal Justice and the Social Psychology of
Blame, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1383, 1435 (2003); Paul W. Kahn, Interpretation.and
Authority in State Constitutionalism, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1147, 1156 (1993).
Information on state judicial term limits is found in 37 COUNCIL OF STATE
GoV'TS, BOOK OF THE STATES 318-21 tbl.5.6 (2005). Examples of long terms for
state judges include fourteen-year initial terms for trial-level judges in New
York, twelve-year terms in Delaware, and ten-year terms in Pennsylvania. Id.
77. See, e.g., Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002)
further for elected judges.
Appointed state judges begin with some form of the same input
from the other branches as Article III judges, but their renewal
processes substantially decrease their independence. These judges
periodically must stand for reappointment by either the executive or
the legislative branch period and risk termination when they act in
ways that displease the branch that considers their renewal.8
While appointed judges are less beholden to the electorate than
elected judges, they remain just a step removed: the branch that
renews judges is itself subject to the winds of electoral change.
There are two sets of system attributes that support
independence. One set is structural: federal judges are selected
through a process that involves both of the other branches; they
have life tenure; and their salary cannot be reduced. State judges
live in a system that is less structurally friendly to independence:
many are elected; some are selected by legislatures; most are closer
to the political process for one reason or another; and their court
budgets are subject to local political contests. When these structural
(holding that a Minnesota law prohibiting judicial candidates from announcing
their views on legal and political issues violates the First Amendment); Weaver
v. Bonner, 309 F.3d 1312, 1320-21 (11th Cir. 2002) (upholding First
Amendment protection of campaign-related speech made by judicial
candidates).
78. In Virginia, judges of state courts of record are elected by a majority
vote of each house of the General Assembly ("GA"). VA. CONST. art. VI, § 7.
Candidates must go through steps, however, before they are voted on by the
GA. First, candidates interview with a panel of citizens and lawyers. Katrice
Hardy, GOP Leaders Hope to Change How Judges are Reappointed, ROANOKE
TIMES, Jan. 27, 2004, at B3. Then, the candidate seeks support "from [her] bar
associations and must win nominations from [her] Senate and House
representatives." Id. The leading candidates then interview with the Senate
and House Courts of Justice committees. Id. After the committees make their
top selections, the Senate and House vote on the judgeships. Id. Virginia's
system of judicial appointment has received criticism, as shown in the case of
Verbena Askew, a Newport News Circuit Judge denied a second term in 2003.
See Robert McCabe, Lawmakers Deny 2nd Term to Judge; Racism Charged in
Controversial Decision on Newport News Jurist, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Jan. 23, 2003,
at Al. Due to lawyers' complaints about Askew's demeanor and work habits on
the bench and due to Askew's failure to disclose during the judicial review
process a complaint filed by a former city employee alleging sexual harassment
and retaliation by Askew, the Senate and House Courts of Justice committees
found Askew was not qualified for reappointment. Id. The decision not to
reappoint Askew resulted in allegations of discrimination based on race and
sexual orientation, as well as allegations that the decision was politically
motivated. Id. More recently, legislators have been working to improve the
judicial appointment process, including proposing a reform that would require
independent performance evaluations of judges up for reappointment. See
Hardy, supra, at B3.
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attributes are present, as they are in the federal judicial system,
they tend to foster independence from interference by the other
branches.
The other set is largely relational, rather than structural:
judges are insulated from most ex parte communication; they are
not to be the recipient of extravagant gifts; and they must monitor
their outside interests. These rules are largely meant to foster
judicial independence from inappropriate influence by the parties to
litigation or others interested in the outcome of litigation. This set
of attributes might more accurately be said to foster impartiality as
much as they foster independence.
In some sense, independence is a personal trait. 9 Structures
can foster it or not. On some level, however, judges are, or are not,
independent because of their personal qualities. State judges might
act independently of political influence from the other branches and
of the electorate, even though structures do not lend support to such
conduct. Such judges run the risk of being ex-judges, and when that
occurs, the structures have won. In any event, even judges of
independent spirit and inclination are not independent in the
judicial sense when their decisions are subject to direct, de novo
review by the agency.
Independence is not an essential attribute of judging. While
many state court judges may function with high levels of
independence, structures to foster high levels of independence are
not in place in most states. One can only conclude that state
government founders did not regard judicial independence with the
same regard as did federal government founders. Independence, at
least the structural independence from interference from the other
branches, is most important when the judiciary is expected to
80function in a counter-majoritarian manner.
79. Edwin Felter distinguishes between "functional" and "practical"
independence. He says functional independence is the personal trait of being
independent, despite structures that disfavor independence. Practical
independence refers to the institutional structures that foster independence.
Edwin L. Felter, Jr., Special Problems of State Administrative Law Judges, 53
ADMIN. L. REV. 403, 413 (2001); see also Ann Marshall Young, Judicial
Independence in Administrative Adjudication: Past, Present, and Future,
JUDGES' J., Summer 1999, at 16, 42 (defining "functional decisional
independence" and "practical decisional independence").
80. See Michael E. Solimine, The Future of Parity, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1457, 1491-94 (2005) ("[Though] there is indeed increasing evidence that many
elections for state supreme courts are hotly contested, costly, and highly
politicized affairs .... [Ilt is not unfair to call these exceptions to the rule of low-
profile [state] judicial campaigns. The majoritarian pressures of the exceptions
are indeed troubling, but they do not support a conclusion that state judges, at
any level, are systematically forfeiting federal constitutional rights due to a fear
IV. ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE INDEPENDENCE
Many reliable and prominent administrative law scholars,81
courts, 2 and administrative judges" use the word "independence" to
describe administrative judges, and seem to assume that
administrative judges are expected to share this attribute with
judicial branch decisionmakers. In fact, administrative judges are
meant to make impartial decisions, but not to be independent.
These two judicial concepts are easily conflated and confused with
one another.'
In the broader sense of "judge" in the federal system, however,
administrative judges cannot be so called. In the first place, not
even the most zealous administrative judge would deny that "[t]he
ALJ... has not been invested with judicial authority independent of
the agency head."8 5 This is a vital difference which forever puts to
rest the idea that administrative judges are judges just as Article III
judges are. Furthermore, Article III judges are given a power
beyond the simple adjudication of disputes. Justice Antonin Scalia
notes this difference in his article on administrative judges,
observing that the Article III judge has the "authority to overrule
the actions of the two elected branches," 6 but that "[n]o such power
inheres in the presiding officers at administrative hearings, even if
Congress chooses to call them judges."87
The Supreme Court has weighed in similarly in this regard,
declaring that, while administrative judges cannot be compared to
the Article III judiciary, they are nevertheless a true judiciary. In
addition to their affirmation of administrative judge judicial status
in Butz v. Economou," the Court's position is further specified in
of the electorate.") (footnotes omitted).
81. KOCH, supra note 38, § 5.24; PIERCE, supra note 38.
82. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513 (1978) ("[Tlhe process of agency
adjudication is currently structured so as to assure that the hearing examiner
exercises his independent judgment .... "); Stephens v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd.,
986 F.2d 493, 494-96 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
83. See Edwin L. Felter, Jr., Maintaining the Balance Between Judicial
Independence and Accountability in Administrative Law, JUDGES' J., Winter
1997, at 22, 22; Young, supra note 79, at 42.
84. See Johnson, supra note 38, at 1014 (discussing judicial independence
and factors that affect judicial decisionmaking).
85. Christopher B. McNeil, The Model Act Creating a State Central Hearing
Agency: Promises, Practical Problems, and a Proposal for Change, 53 ADMIN. L.
REV. 475,515 (2001).
86. Antonin Scalia, The ALJ Fiasco-a Reprise, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 57, 61
(1979).
87. Id. at 61-62.
88. 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
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Ramspeck v. Federal Trial Examiners Conference.89  While
occasionally referring to administrative judges as "quasi-judicial
officers,"" implying that they are not truly judges, the Court
unambiguously affirmed the status of administrative judges as
members of a true judiciary. The Court stated that "Congress
intended to make hearing examiners 'a special class of semi-
independent subordinate hearing officers.'" 9'
The Court was clear that administrative judges are
fundamentally different from Article III judges. It even enumerated
the differences precisely:
The position of hearing examiners is not a constitutionally
protected position. It is a creature of congressional enactment.
The respondents have no vested right to positions as
examiners. They hold their posts by such tenure as Congress
sees fit to give them. Their positions may be regulated
completely by Congress, or Congress may delegate the exercise
of its regulatory power, under proper standards, to the Civil
Service Commission, which it has done in this case."
Administrative judges are not federal judges; they are a
special kind of judge, which is only "semi-independent," and
which is substantially different from the type of judge envisioned
by Article III. What are the causes of these differences? To
answer this question we must first examine the question of
judicial independence generally. What do we mean by saying
that federal judges are independent, and that administrative
judges are "semi-independent"? Their version of independence
should be thought of with this qualification in mind.
There is no need for the defensiveness exhibited in a variety of
administrative judge-written pieces on independence.98 The fact
that administrative judges may not be meant to be independent in
the judicial, especially Article III, sense, does not mean that
administrative judges are not professionals and are not playing a
critical role in the delivery of justice and the application of law.
Their role in delivering justice to individuals is critical. But critical
roles can be played without independence. Administrative judges
need not share every attribute with their Article III counterparts to
be highly regarded.
89. 345 U.S. 128 (1953).
90. Id. at 130.
91. Id. at 132 (footnote omitted) (quoting S. REP. No. 79-752, at 6 (1945),
reprinted in ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, at 187, 192
(William S. Hein & Co. 1997) (1946)).
92. Id. at 133.
93. See, e.g., Young, supra note 79.
Institutional structures say as much as the language of the
rules that establish those institutions. The language of an
individual statute can be the trees that obscure the forest. The
structure of the entire forest reveals the intention of the drafters
and institution designers. Administrative judges were not intended
to be independent in the sense of that word that connotes the usual
judge's attribute. They were meant to be impartial decisionmakers
and advancers of agency policy, not independent ones.
Part III described the structure of judicial independence in the
American system. Do administrative law judges have similar
characteristics? 94 That is, is the independence of administrative
judges such that it serves as a means to the end of judicial
independence, namely, protecting impartiality, preserving integrity
as a separate branch of government, and accountability? The
answer, of course, is no; administrative judges are not meant to be a
separate branch of government. The essential differences lie in
their appointment, their removal, and especially the authority of
their decisions, which makes their position in the governmental
cosmos (as part of the executive branch, not an independent branch
by themselves or part of the judicial branch) perfectly clear.
Administrative judges are so far less independent from various
political and structural forces that they occupy positions that are
different in kind from the Article III and state court judges.
Administrative judges, though they judge, are not in the first
instance members of the judicial branch. They are selected and
renewed by a nonjudicial branch. They have insulation from the
electorate in a sense, but their agency will feel change in the
political climate and fortunes of political parties. But what makes
administrative judges not fundamentally independent is that their
very decisions are reviewed and subject to reversal on law and policy
grounds by their agency, their nonjudicial branch agency.95
One might argue that administrative judges are not
independent from the legislative branch because they have to follow
statutes or are not independent from the executive branch because
they have to follow regulations, but that imposition is no different
from observing that legislation, or even lawfully adopted
94. Overwhelmingly, ALJs themselves say that they are independent,
though they presumably would not ascribe to themselves the same sort of
independence as Article III judges are granted. Ninety percent of ALJs in a
1992 survey said that they thought "independent" described their role well.
Charles H. Koch, Jr., Administrative Presiding Officials Today, 46 ADMIN. L.
REV. 271, 287 (1994). Their opinion is undermined by their own answers to
other parts of the same survey which indicate high levels of perceived
interference with decisionmaking. Id. at 278-79.
95. See 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (2000).
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administrative regulations, "trumps" the common law and judicial
power to make law. But, of course, what the administrative judge
lacks is the judicial review power, the judge's power to interpret
constitutions and declare the legislation or regulation to be beyond
the agency's or legislature's power.96
Article III courts (and analogous state courts) are different in
the independence realm from administrative judges. Administrative
judges do not establish precedent in the same sense that courts do.
A subsequent administrative judge is free to ignore a prior decision
of another administrative judge of the same "rank" in the same97
agency. Courts, by contrast, make law at every turn. Even the
most mundane case that seems merely to follow existing precedent
or apply a statute creates a precedential data point: one more set of
facts for future courts to use for comparison and contrast purposes.!
To be sure, both courts and administrative judges apply law
made by others, but within quite different contexts and constraints.
Administrative judges apply law created by the legislature, by the
executive, by courts, and by agencies, just as courts do. But the
administrative judge's decision is reviewed by the agency, and may
be reversed by it. The court's decision is reviewed within its own
branch, the legislative and executive branches having no first
instance of review of judicial decisions. All that is necessary for an
administrative judge's decision to be reviewed is an appeal by a
party. Since the agency is often a party, in many instances even the
96. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. III; 5 U.S.C. § 556(c) (2000) (detailing powers
and duties of administrative law judges under the Administrative Procedure
Act); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178-80 (1803).
97. Strict obedience to precedent is not necessary, but a departure from
precedent needs to be explained. "Stare decisis is not the rule in administrative
adjudications. Thus, as a matter of doctrine, administrative adjudicators are
not required to follow administrative precedent. Rather, administrative law
has developed a degree of flexibility in its approach to caselaw. On the other
hand, agencies cannot ignore their prior cases." Koch, supra note 36, at 703
(footnotes omitted) (citing Borough of Columbia v. Surface Transp. Bd., 342
F.3d 222, 229 (3d Cir. 2003)). Specifically, the Third Circuit held that, under
the APA, "reviewing courts are to 'hold unlawful and set aside agency action,
findings, and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.' 5 U.S.C. § 706(2). If an
agency departs from its own precedent without a reasoned explanation, the
agency may be said to have acted arbitrarily and capriciously." Id. at 229.
98. Though most judicial opinions create precedent, judicial practices may
prevent some opinions from being used for comparison or contrast purposes.
See Penelope Pether, Inequitable Injunctions: The Scandal of Private Judging
in the U.S. Courts, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1435, 1483-85 (2004) (criticizing the
practice of "private judging" whereby judicial opinions are not published,
removed from publication, or are withdrawn pursuant to stipulation, effectively
removing any precedential value the opinion may have provided).
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aggrieved agency itself can institute an appeal to higher authority
within the agency.99
Beyond the judicial review of a court's decision, it may be said
that courts' decisions are always subject to "review" by the
legislative branch: statutes that the legislature believes judges have
misapplied may be amended, and new, constitutionally permissible
legislation to override common law decisions may be enacted. But
that "review" by other than the judicial branch is hardly the matter-
of-course appeal to higher authority found in the administrative
judicial setting.100 To perform this review of courts, the legislature
must first notice the errant decision. It must overcome inertia and
the distractions of its myriad other tasks to move on the issue. It
must have sufficient time in a session to act. It must garner a
majority for passage. And, in the absence of a supermajority, it
must have the cooperation of the executive. Even then, it must act
within its constitutional parameters or the courts will have the
power to check the legislative action. We regard courts, even with
this form of legislative oversight, as independent of the other
branches. Administrative judges, by contrast, are not independent
of the agency and therefore the nonjudicial branch of which that
agency is a part. High levels of job security and independent spirit
notwithstanding, administrative judges' decisions are not
independent: they are subject to direct review by their own agency.
Since, as we have seen, judicial independence is a means to an
end, and since the means is limited by its end, what is the end of the
degree of independence that administrative judges do have? We saw
that there are two purposes of Article III independence:
maintaining the judiciary's integrity as a third branch of
government (which has the further purpose of checking the other
two branches) and ensuring a lack of external pressure as a means
of ensuring decisional impartiality. For administrative judges, the
situation is different. Administrative judge independence is not
about maintaining the integrity of a third branch of government;
administrative judges are executive agents, and consequently are
part of the second branch. Their independence only serves the goal
of decisional impartiality, and because of its less extensive purpose,
it is itself less extensive. More accurately, they lack independence,
99. KOCH, supra note 38, § 11.10. However, agency staff ordinarily may not
appeal the administrative review to the federal courts. Id.
100. Justice Powell criticized the legislature in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919,
960 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring), for assuming a judicial function when it
reviewed an INS decision that Chadha met the statutory requirement for
permanent residence in the United States. According to Justice Powell, the
legislature exceeded its constitutional authority when it reviewed the agency's
decision regarding the rights of a specific individual. Id.
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and yet must be impartial.
Some prominent scholars have recognized that judicial
independence is not an all-or-nothing proposition. Burbank, in
particular, has identified "the erroneous assumption that judicial
independence is a monolith." °1 He further specified the problem as
the idea that "judicial independence has the same value, even if
instrumental value, no matter what the court."' 2  The clear
implication is that different judges will be independent in different
degrees, depending on the position and function of the courts in
which they function. Burbank describes it in this way:
[T]he insight that judicial independence is a means to an end
(or ends) and not an end in itself suggests that the quantum
and quality of independence (and accountability) enjoyed by
different courts in different systems, and indeed by different
courts within the same system, may not be, and perhaps
should not be, the same.103
The fact that administrative judges do not share the high
degree of independence granted to Article III courts is not, therefore,
necessarily regrettable. It may, in fact, be a good thing, provided
that the lesser independence afforded them helps achieve the end of
the administrative judiciary, which is different, of course, from those
of the Article III judiciary. What is that end?
The amount of independence that a judge has, or ought to have,
is determined by the judge's role; that is, it is determined by the end
to be served by the judge's activity. Since the end of administrative
judge independence is impartial decisionmaking,'04 and not the
maintenance of a separate branch of government, the amount of
independence that an administrative judge has will be determined
by the amount that is necessary for impartial decisionmaking. To
extend this independence beyond that point would be unwise.
What passes as a demand for independence of the
administrative law judge is mostly about impartiality;' 5
administrative judges were not meant to be a check on the other
branches, which is the other, and indeed primary, end of the
101. Burbank, supra note 38, at 325.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 325-26.
104. See supra Part II.
105. 92 CONG. REC. 13, 2164 (1946), reprinted in ADMINISTRATvE PROCEDURE
ACT LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 295, 337 (William S. Hein & Co. 1997) (1946) (stating
that the APA, which created administrative judges, "will result in a greater
assurance of justice at the hands of administrative agencies"). The legislative
history makes no mention of an Article III-style judiciary, but only of an
impartial one.
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independence of Article III judges. Indeed, administrative judges
are called "judges" only in the sense that they are impartial
decisionmakers.' Even before Congress began calling them judges,
in the original Administrative Procedure Act, the legislative history
makes use of the term in order to describe the role, and therefore
the attributes, of administrative law judges. Congress decided that
the "provisions [of the act] mean that presiding officers
[administrative judges] will be required to conduct themselves in the
manner in which people think they should-that is, as judges and
not as the representatives of factions or special interests."0 7
Congress stressed separation from "factions or special interests," not
from the rest of the executive branch. We can see, then, that
Congress intended that the provisions of the act secure a certain
amount of independence for administrative judges as a means
toward impartiality of decisionmaking, whereas for Article III
judges it is a means both for impartiality and the maintenance of a
separate branch of government.
That administrative judges are independent in the sense of
fostering impartiality is not open to dispute.'0 8 The "[e]ssential[s] to
true Uudiciall independence are life tenure, salary protection, and
removal for cause subject to a constitutionally adequate
procedure."' 9 Administrative judges have a measure of all these
things in order to protect their impartiality, although, as shall be
discussed later, they have them to a much lesser degree than Article
III judges.
Courts have affirmed the fact that administrative judges have
this measure of independence which cannot be infringed. The
Supreme Court and the APA have "conferred upon ALJs a right of
independence, the invasion of which present[s] a justiciable
controversy." 0 Furthermore, while the Supreme Court has not yet
106. See supra Part II.
107. 92 CONG. REC. 5, 5650 (1946), reprinted in ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
ACT LEGISLATIVE HIsTORY 295, 364 (William S. Hein & Co. 1997) (1946).
108. Not even, it seems, by administrative judges, who generally insist that
they are not independent, or at least not independent enough. Studies,
however, show that the vast majority of ALJs consider themselves independent
at least in regard to impartiality. In one survey, only nine percent of non-Social
Security ALJs and twenty-six percent of Social Security ALJs said that
pressure to render decisions differently was a problem. See Koch, supra note
94, at 278. While these numbers are unnecessarily high, those judges who do
not fall under ALJ protection found much less significant problems, indicating
that it is not structural difficulties which generate this partial lack of
impartiality-oriented independence. Id. at 278-79.
109. Larkin, supra note 58, at 67.
110. Elaine Golin, Solving the Problem of Gender and Racial Bias in
Administrative Adjudication, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1532, 1542 (1995).
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confirmed these appellate court decisions, many lower courts have
decided administrative judge independence cases so consistently
that they have, in the words of one of these courts itself, produced a
"qualified right of decisional independence.""' The Second Circuit
held that Congress "vested hearing examiners . . . with a limited
independence from the agencies they served.""2  However, even
when courts have defended administrative judge independence, they
have always qualified that independence. As the Second Circuit
ascribed only a "limited independence" to administrative judges,"
other courts have stated even more explicitly that administrative
judges possess only a certain, small degree of independence.
Another court has held that "[t]he AL's independence is not
unlimited. The ALJ is subject to the rules and regulations
promulgated by the agency and is duty-bound to apply these
rules."" '4 The courts consistently affirm that administrative judges
are only partly independent.
11
This lesser independence is not necessarily a bad thing; it is
important to remember that "[i]ncreased judicial independence is
not always better."" 6 Because judicial independence is a means, not
an end in itself, it is only good insofar as it is conducive toward its
end. The end of the administrative judge independence is
impartiality, whereas the end of Article III independence includes
the maintenance of a separate branch of government. How can we
know, however, that the end of administrative judge independence
is merely impartiality? The answer lies in the role of the
administrative judge, which is determined by her place in the
government. The administrative judge cannot be independent for
the sake of the maintenance of the judicial branch for the simple
reason that she is part of one of the other branches, the executive.
11 7
111. Nash v. Califano, 613 F.2d 10, 15 (2d Cir. 1980); see also Golin, supra
note 110, at 1541-43.
112. Nash, 613 F.2d at 14.
113. Id.
114. Stieberger v. Heckler, 615 F. Supp. 1315, 1386 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), vacated
on other grounds by Stieberger v. Bowen, 801 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1986).
115. See Goodman v. Svahn, 614 F. Supp. 726, 728 (D.D.C. 1985) (stating
that no "larger right of decisional independence exists" for administrative
judges beyond that granted in the APA); Ass'n of Admin. Law Judges v.
Heckler, 594 F. Supp. 1132, 1141 (D.D.C. 1984) ("[T]he AIJ's right to decisional
independence is qualified.").
116. Cross, supra note 56, at 195.
117. Young, supra note 79, at 42 ("Traditionally, the concept [of judicial
independence] is seen as including both decisional independence . . . and
institutional or branch independence .... Administrative law judges obviously
do not have branch independence. However, if the public is to be assured of
optimally neutral, impartial, and fair decisions in administrative adjudication,
Administrative judges are part of the executive branch.18 This
statement is obvious on its face. The administrative judge is not
properly a "judge" except in the sense that he is an impartial
decisionmaker;" 9 he is definitely not a judge in the sense of being
part of the judicial branch.120 The failure to make this distinction-
between "judge" as a decisionmaker and "judge" as a member of the
judicial branch of government-is doubtlessly responsible for much
of the confusion on the issue of administrative judge independence.
The distinction is, however, an elementary one and necessary for
any proper understanding of either administrative judges or the
Article III judiciary.
This distinction is chiefly relevant in that it makes perfectly
clear that when dealing with the Article III judiciary and the
administrative judiciary, one is dealing with two entirely separate
bodies with two distinct roles. The administrative judiciary is not
simply a part of the "American judiciary;" it is an executive
judiciary, part of the executive branch and designed to serve the
ends of the executive branch, to administer. The Article III
judiciary, on the other hand, is a separate branch of government and
fulfills a very different role.
The role of the Article III judiciary is to exist as an independent
branch of government, able to strike down the unconstitutional
actions of the other two branches. This is the kind of independence
which makes the American (Article III) judiciary distinct. Many
scholars have held this opinion. Cross has asserted that judicial
independence is "freedom from control or pressure by the other
political branches of government." 2' He cited a number of
prominent cases to that effect, stating that the purpose of judicial
independence is to help balance the courts against the elected
it is necessary that administrative law judges have decisional independence.").
118. Except for those in independent agencies. See Neal Devins, Unitariness
and Independence: Solicitor General Control over Independent Agency
Litigation, 82 CAL. L. REV. 255, 257 (1994).
119. See Young, supra note 79, at 42.
120. This would be true even if a separate corps were established for
administrative judges. While they would appear then to be a body distinct from
the executive, in reality they would still be a part of it, since their decisions
would not only still be reviewable and reversible by the agencies, but also
subject to judicial review, not in the way a lower court's decision is reviewable,
but in the way that an executive action is reviewable. See Felter, supra note 83,
at 22 ("Whether ALJs work directly for agencies or are in more independent
'central panels' of ALJs where they are not directly under any single agency,
they act on behalf of those agencies. As such, they are often expected to help
achieve agency objectives.").
121. Cross, supra note 56, at 195.
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branches. 122
Kaufman, in his thorough article on judicial independence,
argued in another way for the same meaning of the term:
Judicial independence is not a clich6 conjured up by those who
seek to prevent encroachments by the other branches of
government. The term is one of art, defined to achieve the
essential objective of the separation of powers that justice be
rendered without fear or bias, and free of prejudice. 123
Kaufman's article traced the history of the judiciary in England
and America and determined that the Framers, by founding an
independent judiciary, intended to rectify the mistake of the English
Constitution, which placed the judiciary under the control of
Parliament and, therefore, subject to pressures from the
Parliament. 124 He observed that the Framers rejected several plans
for the judiciary that "would have prevented the judiciary from
effectively checking legislative violations of the constitutional
framework,"125 which, he contended, is the purpose of judicial
independence. If the judiciary were not independent, he argued,
"the Constitution's promise of a government of limited powers could
be broken with utter impunity"126 because "the legislative and
executive powers" would not be "kept within the limits prescribed by
[the Constitution] .
The purpose of judicial independence, then, according to
Kaufman, is to maintain a judiciary which can impartially pass
judgment upon the actions of the other branches. This last phrase is
the most important element of independence; indeed, Kaufman
wrote that "[i]t is this additional step [of making the judiciary
independent of the legislative and executive powers], inconceivable
in England, that made the American Constitution truly
revolutionary."12  Judicial independence for Kaufman is for the
purpose of checking the other branches. 29 Independence in the
Article III judiciary is therefore defined by the role which is given to
Article III judges: passing judgment upon the actions of the other
two branches.
122. See id. at 196.
123. Kaufman, Essence of Judicial Independence, supra note 38, at 701.
124. Id. at 672-87.
125. Id. at 686.
126. Id. at 687.
127. Id. at 686-87.
128. Id. at 687.
129. See also Geyh, supra note 38, at 162 (stating that the purpose of judicial
independence is "to facilitate impartial decisionmaking and preserve the
integrity of the judiciary as a separate branch of government").
The role of administrative judges, on the other hand, entails
neither the same purpose nor the same powers. In his article on the
debates about administrative judges, Justice Scalia argued that
administrative judges and Article III judges perform fundamentally
different roles in society. Article III judges have "authority to
overrule the actions of the two elected branches. No such power
inheres in the presiding officers at administrative hearings, even if
Congress chooses to call them judges." 130  So Article III judges
perform a role in society which demands an independence that
administrative judges do not and cannot have:' they make
decisions which can override the actions of the other two political
branches. Administrative judges, on the other hand, are part of one
of those two branches; their decisions are subject to a judicial review
not like a lower court's decision, but like other executive actions. 3'
Because of their role as an executive judiciary, they cannot have
a very extensive independence. It is important to remember that
"[wihether any executive branch agency can actually be completely
independent is problematic."'33 Are administrative judges, however,
truly part of the executive branch? Or are they a fast-developing
split from the executive, soon to be absorbed into the judiciary? The
answer is certainly the former. Despite the safeguards given to
administrative judges to assure their decisional independence (i.e.,
their impartiality) from the executive branch, they are still
unquestionably part of that branch, 34 which is proven by their
complete dependence upon their agencies. That dependence is
manifested in at least four distinct ways: first, by their appointment
130. Scalia, supra note 86, at 61-62.
131. Some administrative judges even acknowledge this fact openly. See,
e.g., Ann Marshall Young, Evaluation of Administrative Law Judges: Premises,
Means, and Ends, 17 J. NAT'L ASS'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 1, 29 (1997) ("AL.Js may
not have the same level of authority, power, or practical independence as
judicial branch judges.").
132. Judicial review of administrative judge decisions is arguably identical
to that of any other executive act. While it maintains certain aspects of normal
judicial review, such as a certain degree of deference in matters of fact, when
judges remand administrative judge decisions they are not remanding them as
they would to a lower court; they are rejecting an executive action and requiring
that its consideration be repeated. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000) (explaining
judicial review of administrative actions).
133. Allen C. Hoberg, Administrative Hearings: State Central Panels in the
1990s, 46 ADMIN. L. REV. 75, 80-81 (1994).
134. While this fact is obvious, scholars, including administrative law
scholars, have occasionally found it necessary to point it out. See, e.g., Young,
supra note 131, at 16 ("[Tlhe obvious fact that the two groups are formally in
different branches of government, even if 'functionally comparable."') (footnote
omitted).
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to office; second, by their evaluation while in office; third, by their
removal from office; and fourth, by the permanency of their
decisions relative to their agencies.
A. Administrative Judge Dependence in Appointment
As regards their appointment, administrative judges are
completely dependent, of course, upon the will of the executive,
whereas the appointment of Article III judges is tempered by "the
Advice and Consent of the Senate."135 Administrative judges are
appointed by their agencies, which are instructed to appoint "as
many administrative law judges as are necessary for proceedings." 136
The officials who do the appointing, however, are all appointed-and
removed-by the president and the president alone. The advice and
consent of the Senate is entirely unnecessary, rendering
administrative judges completely, and obviously, dependent upon
the executive branch. With the necessity of Senate confirmation,
the dependence on the executive for the Article III judiciary is
weakened and diluted. The threat of Senate refusal or even of a
minority filibuster restrains the extent to which the executive
controls the views and nature of the judicial appointees.
B. Administrative Judge Dependence in Evaluation
The evaluation process of administrative judges is so contrary to
independence that Article III judges would never tolerate the system
being applied to themselves nor would Article III permit them to
suffer such a system. Administrative judges are evaluated, and
therefore often promoted, by a system similar to "a supervisor
evaluating a subordinate employee in a traditional management-by-
objectives context, or at least contains aspects of such a process."'37
This method, however, "would no doubt be considered anathema in
the judicial branch" 38 because of its threat to judicial independence:
"[I] t never was contemplated that ALJs would be [similarly] immune
from any performance reviews." 9 In fact, in the years immediately
following the passage of the APA, the Civil Service Commission
made evaluations of hearing examiners which resulted in the
retention of only seventy percent of currently employed examiners.'4
135. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
136. 5 U.S.C. § 3105 (2000).
137. Young, supra note 131, at 17.
138. Id.
139. Jeffrey S. Lubbers, The Federal Administrative Judiciary: Establishing
an Appropriate System of Performance Evaluation for ALJs, 7 ADMIN. L.J. AM.
U. 589, 592 (1993).
140. See Ralph F. Fuchs, The Hearing Examiner Fiasco Under the
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After the Commission had absorbed an enormous amount of flak
and endured many lawsuits from those examiners, it reversed many
of its decisions' and the evaluation of administrative judges was
entirely abandoned.'14 However, despite the difficulties of the
process, it is clear that by current law administrative judges are
subject to performance evaluations by the executive branch,43 which
shows their reduced independence relative to Article III judges.
C. Administrative Judge Dependence in Removal
The process for removal of administrative judges, too, is much
more political than that of Article III judges, though it, too, provides
protection to a certain extent. Disciplinary removals for both types
of judges must meet the same standard: they can only be removed
for "good cause." 4 Article III judges, however, can only be removed
by "the blunderbuss of accountability devices, the impeachment
process," 45 for failure to meet the "good Behaviour"146 standard,
which is an extraordinarily complex procedure and is almost never
undertaken. 147 Administrative judges, however, can be acted against
"for good cause established and determined by the Merit Systems
Protection Board on the record after opportunity for hearing before
the Board.'4 8 A number of factors make this removal very different
from that of an Article III judge. The Merit Systems Protection
Board ("MSPB") consists of only three members, who are appointed,
like Article III judges, "by the President, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate." 9  Three members are more easily
persuaded, for good or bad reasons, than the large body of the
Senate. Furthermore, while decisions of the MSPB are sometimes
subject to judicial review, they are never put into the political
Administrative Procedure Act, 63 HARV. L. REV. 737, 753 (1950).
141. Id. at 753-56.
142. See Lubbers, supra note 139, at 593.
143. See Nash v. Bowen, 869 F.2d 675, 681 (2d Cir. 1989). It is also true,
however, that "the agency won the right to bring charges against low producing
ALJs but was handed a virtually insurmountable burden of proof." Lubbers,
supra note 139, at 599-600.
144. 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a) (2000).
145. Geyh, supra note 38, at 163.
146. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
147. See Jason J. Vicente, Impeachment: A Constitutional Primer, 3 TEX.
REV. L. & POL. 117, 133-41 (1998) (discussing impeachment proceedings against
twelve judges, including John Pickering, Samuel Chase, and Walter Nixon,
among others).
148. 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a). This specific process applies only to ALJs. Id.
149. 5 U.S.C. § 1201; see also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (providing that the
president "shall have Power... [to] nominate, and by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, [to] appoint ... Judges of the Supreme Court").
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process, making removal of an administrative judge much more
subject to arbitrariness. 5 °
This is not to say, however, that administrative judges can be
removed arbitrarily or easily. Most federal employees can be
removed under a much less exacting standard; the decision to
remove can be "only for such cause as will promote the efficiency of
the service." 151  Federal employees are also entitled to a more
minimal procedure than administrative judges.152 Furthermore, the
MSPB demands "a high threshold of proof in agency actions against
ALJs."5 3 These combined factors have led some scholars to the
result that "ALJs [have] essentially the same protections that the
Constitution gives Article III judges."" This, however, is not quite
true. Justice Scalia has noted this similarity in protections given to
Article III judges and administrative judges, but would not equate
the two. While Article III judges are almost entirely independent in
tenure and salary (except for that mostly illusory threat,
impeachment), administrative judges are only "largely independent
in matters of tenure and compensation.' ' 15  Their tenure and salary
150. It is true, however, that this avenue has been taken so rarely that it
could arguably be considered a dead letter. That opinion, however, does not
seem reflected by the facts. As recently as 1999, suit was brought and won
dismissing an administrative judge for good cause. See Carr v. SSA, 185 F.3d
1318 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Furthermore, though lost, another case was brought in
1984 to remove an administrative judge, which establishes that no one denies
the ability of the MSPB to so remove. See SSA Dep't of Health and Human
Servs. v. Glover, 23 M.S.P.R. 57 (1984). Finally, in 1980, another case was
brought and won for removal of an administrative judge. See In re Chocallo, 2
M.S.P.B. 20, 1 M.S.P.R. 605 (1980). So while it is true that only twenty-four
cases have been brought for removal of an administrative judge for good cause,
and only five of these have been won, this statistic does not invalidate the fact
that the standard is both viable and less stringent than that governing Article
III judges. For the statistics, see Morell E. Mullins, Manual for Administrative
Law Judges, 23 J. NAT'L ASS'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 1, 116 (2004).
151. 5 U.S.C. § 7513(a) (2000).
152. See id. § 7513(b)-(d). An employee is entitled to thirty days notice,
unless the agency has reason to believe that said employee has committed a
crime that carries a jail sentence; at least seven days in which to respond; to be
represented by an attorney; and to be given a written decision justifying his
removal at the earliest possible date. Id. § 7513(b). The agency may provide a
hearing. Id. § 7513(c). The employee is entitled to appeal to the Merit Systems
Protection Board under 5 U.S.C. § 7701. Id. § 7513(d). It can easily be seen
that the administrative judge enjoys substantially more protection, even beyond
the standard for removal. See supra text accompanying notes 147-48 for the
protections afforded to administrative judges.
153. Golin, supra note 110, at 1538.
154. Id.
155. Scalia, supra note 86, at 59 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 79-1980, at 46
(1946), reprinted in ADMINIsTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT LEGISLATIvE HIsTORY 235,
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are still much more easily adjusted or removed than are those of any
Article III judge. Administrative judges are not, therefore, as
independent as Article III judges in the protections given them
against arbitrary removal, though they are more protected than the
average federal employee.
Furthermore, the MSPB is not the only path to removal of
administrative judges; many other methods for removing them are
available. First, an administrative judge can be suspended or
removed by the head of an agency (who is an executive appointee)
"when he considers that action necessary in the interests of national
security."' After a certain, very minimal, required procedure, 57 the
decision of the agency is final,' 58 and it is not subject to judicial
review except insofar as such review is necessary to ensure
compliance with that minimal procedure. 1 9  Second, an
administrative judge can be removed by a "reduction-in-force,"
which is simply a reduction in the federal workforce, the
requirements of which are set by the Office of Personnel
Management, an executive agency. 60 This is nothing like the tenure
protections afforded to Article III judges.'6 ' Even if these methods
280 (William S. Hein & Co. 1997) (1946)) (emphasis added). See also S. REP.
No. 79-752, at 29 (1945), reprinted in ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 189, 215 (William S. Hein & Co. 1997) (1946) (explaining
that "the tenure and compensation requirements" of the bill were "designed to
make examiners largely independent") (emphasis added).
156. 5 U.S.C. § 7532(a) (2000). This provision is not affected by the
limitation on removal in § 7521(a); see id. § 7521(b)(A).
157. All that is required is that the suspended or removed employee, if he
"has a permanent or indefinite appointment," "has completed his probationary
or trial period," and "is a citizen of the United States," is that he be told in
writing of the charges against him within thirty days, that he be given the
opportunity to answer the charges within thirty days of being told in writing,
that he be given a hearing by an agency authority (the same agency that has
suspended or removed him), if he so requests, that the head of the agency
review the decision, and that he be given the head of the agency's decision in
writing. Id. § 7532(c). This is hardly the sort of constant checks given to those
who would impeach Article III justices, even when they appear to be national
security risks.
158. Id. § 7532(b).
159. See, e.g., Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46, 64 (1950), affd 341 U.S.
918 (1951).
160. 5 U.S.C. § 3502. This provision is also not affected by the limitation on
removal in § 7521(a). See id. § 7521(b)(B).
161. It is true that "[t]he prohibition against removal except for good cause,
after hearing, has been broadly construed," and that "the APA is to be given a
generous interpretation in light of the over-riding objective of hearing officer
independence," but that does not change the fact that the protections granted to
administrative judges by the APA are nothing like that granted to judges by the
Constitution of 1789. Bernard Schwartz, Adjudication and the Administrative
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and constraints are rarely employed, they remove the institutional
structures supporting independence of action by administrative
judges.
D. Administrative Judge Dependence in Finality
Most fundamentally, administrative judges are subservient to
their agencies in the permanency of their decisions. Except in the
limited manner outlined by the constitutional separation of powers
doctrine, genuinely independent judges in the courts are immune
from executive override; administrative judges are not only subject
to it, but also often require executive affirmation in order for their
decisions to be final. 162 Clearly, they are not as independent as
Article III judges in this respect.
Judges in the judicial branch are independent in the sense that
their decisions are final. Of course, they are subject to review, but
only from within the judicial branch. Even if the legislature chooses
to pass a statute to override judicial precedent, the decisions of the
courts in those particular cases cannot be altered; their decisions are
truly independent of the other two branches. Judges under Article
III thus have the greatest possible amount of independence short of
an absolute authority; administrative judges, on the other hand, are
crucially dependent, both in that their decisions often require
executive affirmation and in that they are always subject to
executive review.
The APA allows the agency to affirm, alter, or completely
override the decision of the administrative judge. 16 3  The Act
provides that "[w]hen the presiding employee makes an initial
decision, that decision then becomes the decision of the agency
without further proceedings,"'64 which seems to imply independence.
However, the Act further specifies that this is the case "unless there
is an appeal to, or review on motion of, the agency within time
provided by rule."'65 The appeal can be made by either party in the
dispute; indeed, often one of the parties is the agency itself, and it
can appeal the decision to itself. 66 Upon appeal, the agency "has all
Procedure Act, 32 TULSA L.J. 203, 211 (1996) (footnote omitted).
162. Of course, an appeal or motion must come first. See infra notes 163-68
and accompanying text.
163. See 5 U.S.C. § 557.
164. Id. § 557(b).
165. Id.
166. See, e.g., Kenneth Nickolai, Strengthening the Skills of Administrative
Law Judges, 20 J. NAT'L ASS'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 263, 265 (2000) ("[Jludges [are]
employed by the agency whose actions they are often reviewing."); Schwartz,
supra note 161, at 204-05 (stating that the agency is often "the opposite party").
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the powers which it would have in making the initial decision,"67
meaning that it can conduct, if it so wishes, a completely de novo
review of the administrative judge's initial decision. Indeed, one
court has held that "[oln matters of law and policy ...ALJs are
entirely subject to the agency.'
168
Most Article III judges are, indeed, subject to being overruled by
a higher authority. However, Article III judges can only be
overruled within the judicial branch; administrative judges can be
overruled by the agency.1 69 Furthermore, Article III judges can only
be overruled in findings of fact when they are clearly erroneous,
whereas to apply this rule to agencies reviewing administrative
judges' decisions "goes too far.' 170  An agency has "the power of
ruling on facts and policies in the first instance."171 It is clear that,
under the APA, "[t]he powers of an agency reviewing an initial or
recommended decision of its examiner are greater than those of an
appellate court reviewing the decision of a trial judge."72 While the
administrative judge's findings are certainly given significant
weight,7 7 none of them, not even the factual determinations, are
binding on the agency in review.1 7 4 The agency is omnipotent when
it comes to administrative judge decisions.175
167. 5 U.S.C. § 557(b).
168. Ass'n of Admin. Law Judges v. Heckler, 594 F. Supp. 1132, 1141
(D.D.C. 1984).
169. See, e.g., Reyes v. Bowen, 845 F.2d 242, 244 (10th Cir. 1988) ("The
Secretary may review any decision of an ALJ, and the Secretary, acting through
the Appeals Council, makes the final judicially reviewable decision in a given
case.").
170. FCC v. Allentown Broad. Corp., 349 U.S. 358, 364 (1955).
171. Id.
172. NLRB v. A.P.W. Prods. Co., 316 F.2d 899, 904 (2d Cir. 1963).
173. Though not as much weight as a trial judge's are given by a superior
court. While the "clearly erroneous" standard must be met before an appellate
judge can reverse a trial judge's finding of fact, the agency need only meet the
"substantial evidence" test that the administrative judge was wrong. See 5
U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (2000); FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a). There are, however, a few
additional and relatively unburdensome strictures which must be observed by
the overruling agency. For example, "it is well settled that administrative
agencies must give reasons for their decisions," and "[i]f the Appeals Council
rejects the ALJ's decision, it must fully articulate its reasons." Reyes, 845 F.2d
at 244-45. Also, courts in review give such rejections heightened scrutiny. Id.
at 245; see also Aylett v. Sec'y of Hous. & Urban Dev., 54 F.3d 1560, 1565 (10th
Cir. 1995); Bechtel Const. Co. v. Sec'y of Labor, 50 F.3d 926, 933 (11th Cir.
1995). Also, "[s]tates generally have adopted a similar position either by
statute or case law." Flanagan, supra note 2, at 1368 (footnotes omitted).
174. See generally Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 494-97
(1951).
175. Indeed, one state administrative judge considered this omnipotence to
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In effect, administrative judges were originally merely agents of
the commission or board at the top of the agency. Such agents were
needed to handle the business of the agency when it grew beyond
the capacity of the board or commission members. Agencies retain
all their powers when reviewing administrative judge decisions, as if
they had presided over the hearing in the first instance. 176 Many
"decisions" of administrative judges are mere suggestions or
recommendations to the agency. 177 Article III judges are under no
such authority.
Indeed, this particular facet of administrative judge
independence receives wide support from all communities, including
some administrative judges.' Administrative judges, unlike Article
III judges, exist in order to further the policies of the executive
branch, specifically the agency for which they judge, through the
impartial adjudication of disputes. Allowing administrative judges
final authority over policy and perhaps even over fact findings,
however, would thwart that end. Flanagan argues that granting
final authority "will significantly alter state contested case
adjudication by creating inconsistencies between the agencies'
articulated policies and the results achieved through contested case
litigation and will adversely affect the agency's enforcement of its
statutory mandate."76 Administrative judges would be rendered
capable of deciding cases in contradiction with the stated policies of
the executive branch.
While it is undeniable that sometimes such decisions must be
made, it is definitely arguable that administrative judges are the
proper people to make them.80 It is the purpose of the Article III
courts to pass judgment on the lawfulness of executive policies; it is
the purpose of the administrative judiciary to pass judgments in
be indispensable:
If the ALJ exercises true judicial independence and chooses from
among these conflicting analytical approaches without regard to the
direction of the executive administration, then the electoral
mandate-the voice of the people through which the executive officer
obtained her or his office-will not be realized and indeed the ALT will
elevate the position to that of a sovereign.
McNeil, supra note 85, at 520.
176. 5 U.S.C. § 557(b).
177. Id. § 554(d).
178. See, e.g., McNeil, supra note 85, at 515.
179. Flanagan, supra note 2, at 1362.
180. See id. at 1398 ("[A]gency review produces results that are supported by
the law and the facts."). Considering that at least seventy-five percent of ALJ
decisions are adopted entirely by the agency, id. at 1365, one might think that
finality would be superfluous; however, the desire for Article III independence
is not so easily satiated.
order to further them. Such authority is irreconcilable with their
role as an executive judiciary; 8 ' furthermore, there is reliable
evidence that it will produce uncertainty in the law and a loss in
accountability, and will nullify agency experience in applying the
law and agency discretion in applying its own rules.82
Would uniting all administrative judges into a central panel
serve to achieve genuine or Article III independence among
administrative judges? The central panel proposal is
enthusiastically supported by administrative judges themselves,
who often denounce the present system as depriving administrative
judges of their due independence. Palmer, for example, stated that
"[tlhe 40 years that have passed since the enactment of the APA
have revealed the ALJ system to have many strengths but the
subordination of the administrative judiciary to agency dominion
has proven to be its one intrinsic flaw which now requires
remedy."183 What is that remedy? Palmer would propose the central
panel solution to attempts by agencies to control their
administrative judges."s Many states have such a central panel in
place already, and Palmer says that "[e]ach state has reported the
new system to be a complete success."' 8' Nor are administrative
judges the first to make this proposal with such enthusiasm.
A substantial minority of the Committee which proposed the
APA to Congress supported a central panel: "Instead of establishing
the examiners as an independent corps, as recommended in the
minority report, the responsibility for protecting critical elements in
the employment of hearing examiners was entrusted to the Civil
Service Commission."18  Also, "[tihe Judicial Administration
181. See, e.g., Jim Rossi, ALJ Final Orders on Appeal: Balancing
Independence with Accountability, 19 J. NAT'L ASS'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 1, 2
(1999) ("AI_ finality... risks undermining core executive branch functions and
thwarting accountability norms."). Indeed, Rossi even questions the
constitutionality of the idea. Id. at 10. ("[T]he cases are decidedly unhelpful in
addressing whether delegation of final order authority to an AUJ outside of a
politically accountable agency is constitutional.").
182. See Flanagan, supra note 2, at 1399-1411. Flanagan defends these
views extensively and ably, and his article has never received an adequate
response from anyone of an opposing outlook. His final conclusion-that "the
executive department has lost some of its ability to enforce the law," id. at 1410,
because of ALJ finality-is another cogent and unanswered argument in favor
of continuing the present system of agency review.
183. Victor W. Palmer, The Administrative Procedure Act: After 40 Years,
Still Searching for Independence, JUDGES' J., Winter 1987, at 34, 39.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 37; see also Fuchs, supra note 140, at 739 ("[C]orps of highly
responsible hearing officers [was] originally put forward by the Attorney
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Division passed a resolution in 1983 favoring the passage of
legislation to establish federal administrative law judges as an
independent corps."87  More recently, a 1992 Administrative
Conference of the United States study recommended against the
central panel approach for the federal administrative judiciary.88
Other scholars have considered the central panel proposal as only
one way of implementing the ultimate goal of ensuring "[wihat is
important," which "is that the court/corps not be part of the agency
on whose actions it is to sit in judgment."'89 The hunger of
administrative judges for the additional independence that a central
corps would grant them and that of legal authorities for a more
independent administrative judiciary is obvious. Would the
increased independence of a central panel ultimately affect the
nature of independence enjoyed by administrative judges? Not
really.
Administrative judges perform a certain role in government,
and the organization used to achieve that role would not change the
central fact of agency review of administrative judge decisions.
Even administrative judges themselves recognize this fact; Felter
stated it explicitly, arguing that "[wihether ALJs work directly for
agencies or are in more independent 'central panels' of ALJs where
they are not directly under any single agency, they act on behalf of
those agencies," and that therefore "they are often expected to help
achieve agency objectives."' 90 While the central panel may or may
not increase the impartiality of administrative judges, which would
be conducive to their role and therefore a positive change in the
organization of the administrative judiciary, it would not render
them independent in a way comparable to that of Article III judges.
There is, in fact, significant evidence in support of the proposal
of many administrative judges that a central panel would increase
the efficiency of administrative adjudication as well as the
impartiality of administrative adjudicators. '' Indeed, "[tihe basic
General's Committee.").
187. Palmer, supra note 183, at 39.
188. PAUL R. VERKUIL ET AL., ADMIN. CONF. OF THE U.S., THE FEDERAL
ADMINISTRATIVE JUDICIARY 1059 (1992).
189. Hoffman & Cihlar, supra note 2, at 878; see also Jim Rossi, Overcoming
Parochialism: State Administrative Procedure and Institutional Design, 53
ADMIN. L. REV. 551, 568 (2001) ("[T]he central panel promotes independence
. . . [bly removing ALJs from the managerial auspices of the agencies whose
matters they adjudicate .. ").
190. Felter, supra note 83, at 22.
191. Interestingly enough, Justice Scalia admitted the possible truth of this
statement in his famous piece on the administrative judiciary, in which he
comes down somewhat ambivalently, but more negatively than positively, on
purpose of the central panel system is to give ALJs a certain amount
of independence from the agencies over whose proceedings they
preside,"9 ' which will presumably ensure an impartiality which is
unachievable when they are employees of the agencies. Further
claimed benefits include "the likelihood of fairness, in fact, the
appearance of fairness, case management and workload efficiencies,
cost efficiencies, decisional independence, [and] protection of hearing
officers." 9 3  The idea can, from the perspective of most
administrative judges, only be praised, and its effects would be
universally beneficial.
In fact, many states have already implemented a central panel
for their administrative judiciaries, and the results seem to be
uniformly positive. Hoberg notes that "[tihe general consensus is
that central panel systems have worked well in the states."9 4 One
commentator argued that a central panel increases professionalism,
or at least the appearance of professionalism, among administrative
judges; 95 another, remarking about Oregon's recent establishment of
a central panel, appeared to believe the measure to be the final
realization of Utopia: "This [the central panel] is not simply good
government. It is best government.' 9 6 But does the central panel
really serve the ends of executive adjudication?
This issue is tied very closely to that of administrative judge
judicial independence, just as is the issue of administrative judge
finality discussed earlier. 9 7 "Both central panels and ALJ finality
are intimately related to ALJ independence,"'9' since both are an
attempt to distance the administrative judge from the agency-and,
ultimately, the executive branch-of which she is a part. Flanagan
argues that "[t]he rationale for central panels, whether in state or
federal government, is the desire for the institutional independence
the central panel proposal. "The problem of improper influence," he argues,
"would also be solved by implementing proposals for establishment of a unified
AIJ corps, headed by an independent administrator." Scalia, supra note 86, at
79 (footnote omitted). He also, however, makes another observation: that the
central panel is only valuable insofar as it does not alter the role of the
administrative judiciary. Id.
192. Hoberg, supra note 133, at 76.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 78.
195. See generally Bruce H. Johnson, Strengthening Professionalism Within
an Administrative Hearing Office: The Minnesota Experience, 53 ADMIN. L. REV.
445 (2001) (explaining how the Office of Hearing Examiners has strengthened
the professional standing of Minnesota's administrative judiciary).
196. Thomas E. Ewing, Oregon's Hearing Officer Panel, 23 J. NAT'L ASS'N
ADMIN. L. JUDGES 57, 89 (2003).
197. See supra text accompanying notes 162-68.
198. Flanagan, supra note 2, at 1382.
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of ALJs." 99 In other words, the central panel is an attempt to
transform administrative judges from being administrative law
judges to being essentially equivalent to Article III judges, passing
judgment upon the executive branch and free to advance or hinder
executive policies as they see fit.20  While central panels vary
greatly in their organization,"' and, therefore, in the degree of such
202 faseparation they permit, insofar as they further the rupture of the
administrative judiciary from the executive branch, they are an
undesirable development in the law.
A primary symptom of this severance by central panels of
administrative judges from their executive adjudicative role is the
power they are sometimes given to enter final decisions, with the
agency having no power of review. While it is true that "ALJ
independence in the central panel structure does not require ALJ
finality,"20 3 many people support the central panel for the specific
purpose of achieving this finality. According to the Model Act, an
administrative judge can sometimes issue a final decision and
sometimes initial decisions;2 4 under the current federal APA,
however, they can issue only initial decisions. 20 5 Does this power to
make final decisions alter the role of the administrative judge as an
executive judiciary? Essentially, such a power transforms the
administrative judge into a carbon copy of an Article III judge, able
to render judgments on the actions of the executive branch without
199. Id.
200. See Rossi, supra note 181, at 10 ("AI.J finality risks thwarting agency
accountability, leaving law and policy decisions in the hands of ALJs.")
(emphasis added). While Rossi here is not speaking precisely about central
panels themselves, ALU finality is seen only within the central panel model. Id.
at 3-5.
201. See, e.g., Allen C. Hoberg, Ten Years Later: The Progress of State
Central Panels, 21 J. NAT'L ASS'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 235, 236-44 (2001)
(comparing central panel organizations in Maryland, North Dakota, and Texas);
Hoberg, supra note 133, at 78-89 (examining central panel organizations in a
number of states); McNeil, supra note 85, at 483-94 (discussing various aspects
of the central panels of several states).
202. In fact, some organizations of central panels allow no such separation.
See, e.g., Flanagan, supra note 2, at 1383 ("ALJ independence in the central
panel structure does not require AIJ finality."). However, it is also clear that
"providing ALJs institutional independence [through the central panel] makes
the argument for AU finality more appealing," id., and it is the extent to which
this is true that ought to govern our decision about whether or not to implement
the central panel proposal, see infra text accompanying note 211.
203. Flanagan, supra note 2, at 1383.
204. McNeil, supra note 85, at 497.
205. Unless there is no appeal; whenever there is, or when the agency
simply decides that it would like to review, the initial decision is not final until
the agency confirms it. See 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (2000).
any review from that branch. That is not the role for which
administrative judges were created.2 °6
Perhaps, however, justice can only be served feasibly by
granting judicial authority to administrative judges. The core of
this debate is the role of administrative judges in advancing agency
policy. If administrative judges are part of the executive branch
meant to advance agency policy, then naturally they cannot pass
judgments that remake that policy, and their independence only
extends to the protection of their role of advancing that policy; if, on
the other hand, they are not part of the executive branch and not
meant to advance agency policy, then what role is left to them but
the judicial one, judging the executive as they see fit? While
administrative judges are certainly charged with the impartial
administration of justice, they are charged with that administration
in accordance with the policies of the executive and the particular
agency. If they were meant to be independent of the executive
branch, Congress would have established administrative courts in
the judicial branch, which is certainly within its power. °7 The fact
that it instead established executive courts indicates that it had
something else in mind. These executive courts are meant to
administer justice impartially, and they do so for a massive number
of Americans, far more than does the judicial branch itself.2 0 8 The
judicial branch could have been expanded to encompass the same
206. See, e.g., Pat McCarran, Foreword to ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY III (William S. Hein & Co. 1997) (1946) (stating that the
Administrative Procedure Act was "intended as a guide to him who seeks fair
play and equal rights under law, as well as to those invested with executive
authority"). Nowhere is any mention made of giving administrative judges
judicial-branch authority; they are intended to be "invested with executive
authority," and therefore part of the executive branch, nothing more. See also
Flanagan, supra note 2, at 1388, who makes an excellent argument worthy of
quoting in its entirety:
Another argument made in support of AIJ finality is that it protects
AL independence. The argument that AL finality enhances ALJ
independence is true, in the sense that final order authority does
make the ALJ completely independent of the agency. The argument,
however, confuses the means with the end. ALJ independence is an
important factor in administrative adjudication when it eliminates
improper agency influence, but certainly, it is not the purpose of
agency adjudication to make AIJs independent.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
207. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 ("The judicial Power of the United States,
shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.").
208. See, e.g., O'Keeffe, supra note 2, at 591 ("ALJs process a larger case
load than United States district judges and affect the rights of a larger number
of citizens .... ") (footnote omitted).
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volume of cases, and the need for an executive judiciary could have
been thereby eliminated. Such a judiciary, however, serves
purposes beyond simply the administration of justice; it also helps
further executive goals by administering justice according to the
interpretations of the executive branch. If administrative judges are
not kept subject to agency interpretations of the law-as they are so
kept by the mechanism of agency review2°9-then they have ceased
to be an executive judiciary, and one of the most useful bodies in the
administrative state has reformed itself out of existence.
Having corps of administrative judges dedicated to adjudication
according to the policies of the executive branch may be an excellent
mechanism for ensuring the furtherance of the goals of one of the
political branches of government, the branch which chose those
administrative judges with precisely that purpose in mind. Through
their impartial decisionmaking, administrative judges are a unique
and invaluable part of the executive process, and the Article III
judiciary remains in place to halt any abuses of executive authority
that administrative judges might inadvertently assist.2 0 To sever
administrative judges from this role, therefore, is to destroy their
particular genius; it is to transform the immensely useful executive
judiciary into a largely redundant copy of the Article III courts. This
does not, of course, condemn the proposal to create a central panel of
209. Theoretically, at least. But the fact is that administrative judges, and
even their non-protected counterparts in the federal system, often do not apply
themselves to their duty of furthering the agency's policy choices. See Koch,
supra note 94, at 282-84. This only reinforces the need to avoid exacerbating
the situation further by giving administrative judges yet another reason to
consider themselves unbound by agency policy.
210. McNeil argues that, since administrative judges are bound to further
executive policies and not to pass judgment on them (arguing that being the
role of the judicial branch), administrative judges have "not been invested with
judicial authority independent of the agency head, and as such, must follow the
mandate of the agency head and construe the law consistent with the agency's
interpretation of the law (even if... the agency head was wrong in his or her
construction of the law)." McNeil, supra note 85, at 515. Therefore, an
administrative judge may be furthering some kind of injustice against his own
inclination. However, the decision about whether that particular agency policy
or interpretation of the law is contrary to justice belongs, in our system of
government, to the judiciary; the administrative judge, being a member of the
executive branch, is not competent to pass judgment on it, and is, therefore,
bound to follow it. Professional ethics is about role, and the administrative
judge must adhere to his role as an executive, not judicial, adjudicator; the
judicial branch will do its job, and the executive, including the administrative
judge, will do its. Those who worry about such adjudication furthering
injustice, therefore, should remember that executive actions are subject to
judicial review whether they are done directly by the President himself or
indirectly through administrative judges following agency policies.
administrative judges; it only dictates care in its formation to secure
the position of administrative judges as, essentially, servants of the
agencies. Justice Scalia notes the possibility that "the unified corps
would make a fundamental change in the perceived role of the
administrative law judge as the 'front line' of the agency itself rather
than an impartial outsider; and it is that issue which should
probably control the fate of the proposal."21' Administrative judges
are too important in their current role for them to abandon it and
adopt another. Their lack of judicial-style independence is perhaps
its own asset to fulfilling the administrative judiciary's proper role.
212 "thEven in central panel states, much the same may be said.
True, in such states, the judges will feel less a part of any particular
agency and its internal hierarchy. But the central fact of review
remains: central panel administrative judges' decisions are also
reviewed directly by agencies, often case-party agencies. This is the
key fact that largely deprives administrative judges of the judicial
independence trait.
In reality, nothing is fundamentally changed with the
institution of the central panel concept. The administrative
judiciary simply becomes a judiciary within the executive
branch/administrative state. This feature may further serve to
insulate the administrative judge in an impartiality sense, but the
administrative judge remains a member of the executive branch,
fully subject to override by the agency.
Administrative judges are understandably zealous to protect
their degree of independence, but in their zeal they often neglect
their obvious dependence relative to the judicial branch. Indeed,
sometimes they even claim to have more independence than Article
III judges, or at least as much. Some administrative judges have
claimed that "[t]he need for judicial independence in the
administrative judiciary is just as pressing as the need for judicial
independence in the judicial branch."213 Independence is the "gold
standard" for a judiciary. Emerging judiciaries around the globe are
aspiring to its promise to reform governing structures. It is natural
211. Scalia, supra note 86, at 79.
212. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1092.01 (2004); GA. CODE ANN. § 50-13-
40 (2006); MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T § 9-1602 (LexisNexis 2004); TEx. GOV'T
CODE ANN. § 2003.021 (Vernon 2000); Yvette N. Diamond, OAH-What's It All
About?, MD. B.J., Jan/Feb. 2006, at 4, 6 (describing Maryland's Office of
Administrative Hearings as "a centralized panel of ALJs in a separate and
independent agency under the executive branch of the Maryland state
government"). See generally James F. Flanagan, An Update on Developments in
Central Panels and ALJ Final Order Authority, 38 IND. L. REV. 401 (2005);
Flanagan, supra note 2.
213. Felter, supra note 83, at 22.
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for administrative judges to claim it. But, "[t]o call for the ALJ to
aspire to judicial independence ... offers real potential for the loss
of public trust and confidence in the administrative adjudicative
process" 214 because the public would no longer be able to rely on
administrative judge fidelity to agency goals and policies. 2 "5 While
this role of furthering agency policies may not be as glamorous as
that of the Article III judiciary, it defines the essential quality of
administrative judges' work that makes them indispensable to the
administration of justice.
CONCLUSION
There is no need for the defensiveness exhibited in a variety of
administrative judge-written pieces on independence. The fact that
administrative judges may not be meant to be independent in the
judicial, especially Article III, sense, does not mean that
administrative judges are not professionals, and are not playing a
critical role in the delivery of justice and the application of law.
Their role in delivering justice to individuals is critical. But critical
roles can be played without independence. Administrative judges
need not share every attribute with courts to be highly regarded.
It is no criticism or slander to administrative judges to say that
they are not meant to be independent in the judicial sense.
Administrative judges are not meant to be checks on out-of-bounds
exercises of legislative and executive power. They are, however,
meant to deliver, impartially, a tremendous measure of front-line
justice to individuals. In this regard, their work certainly exceeds
that of Article III judges and perhaps that of state court judges as
well. This is the distinction of administrative judges worth
defending against the encroachments of claims of judicial
independence.
214. McNeil, supra note 85, at 514.
215. McNeil provides a lengthy argument about the importance of A1.J
fidelity to executive policies which would be compromised by granting them
Article III-type independence. Id. at 512-14. That administrative judges are, at
least to a certain degree, bound to promote agency policies does not seem open
to question. See, e.g., Lubbers, supra note 139, at 592 (asserting that
administrative judges are "a group of critical employees charged with
implementing an agency's policy but nevertheless supposedly independent of
the agency") (quoting O'Keeffe, supra note 2, at 594)).
